though it upheld the contribution restrictions and the public funding system for presidential candidates. The result was the construction of a hybrid system, consisting of public and private components, equalizing and free spending elements.
The system appeared to work well enough at first. The 1976 presidential election, the first held under the regimen of reform, was profoundly different from its predecessors: the major candidates derived their funding largely from public subsidies and enjoyed relatively equal financial resources. The contribution limits applicable to all federal candidates also helped to curb the influence of large private donors on congressional elections.
Two recently published studies of political finance during the 1980 campaigns, however, suggest that 1976 was not so much the harbinger of a new era in election finance as the apogee of the reform impulse. The two books, one by a political journalist and the other by an academic specialist in campaign finance, differ significantly in format and style. Alexander's Financing the 1980 Electzon, the sixth in his quadrennial series of reviews of campaign finance, is a comprehensive analysis of the financial history of the 1980 elections based largely on data compiled by the Federal Election Commission from reports submitted by candidates, political parties, and other campaign spenders and donors. The raw material of Drew's Politics and Mon.ey consists of interviews with politicians, political operatives, and large contributors, newspaper accounts of their activities, and the author's own experiences and observations. While Alexander strives to be purely descriptive and objective, Drew's book is a polemic against the "corrupting" effects of private money on the political process. Yet the two works complement each other and-with Drew's interviews supplementing Alexander's statistics-combine to demonstrate that while the 1970's reforms sought to alter the nature of political fund-raising and spending, in the 1980 campaign private wealth and special interest expenditures resumed their pivotal roles.
This review analyzes Drew's and Alexander's findings concerning the effects of FECA on the financing of the general election phase of the 1980 presidential and congressional elections.6 These financial histories of the 1980 elections suggest that the mix of public and private components in our campaign finance system has proven unstable, and that public and private methods of financing political campaigns may not be easily reconcilable in a single system after all. If this is the case, Congress and the Court may have to consider again the degree to which our election campaigns should be publicly or privately funded. That will require the resolution of the underlying question of what the role of private wealth-and of private ine- 6 . This review will not address the provisions of the public funding law dealing with the presidential primaries or the funding of minor party or independent candidates. Alexander reviews the financial history of the prenomination phase of the 1980 election, H. Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election 135 (1983) , and the financing of John Anderson and the minor party candidates, id. at 341-57. Drew did not examine these aspects of the 1980 election.
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quality-should be in financing an electoral process nominally predicated on the norm of political equality.
The drafters of FECA envisioned a presidential campaign finance system in which the major party candidates would be endowed with equal financial resources, to be drawn almost exclusively from public funds.7
Under FECA, each major party candidate is entitled to receive a $20 million federal grant, adjusted for inflation.8 FECA also permits a modest financial role for the national committees of the major political parties.9
Beyond that, the campaign finance law prohibits major party candidates who receive public funds from accepting any private contributions and from making any expenditures greater than their public allotments. In 11. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 299 (Table 7-1). 12. Id. 13. Id. at 297-98.
14. Id. at 299. their full authorization; the Democrats spent slightly less.'5 In this "campaign," the goals of relative equality and independence from private contributions were met. It was the other two "campaigns," which were funded from private donations and provided unequal amounts of support to the major party candidates, which set 1980 apart from 1976 and pointed in the direction of 1972.
B.
The "second campaign," as described by Alexander, consisted of privately funded spending out of the candidates' control but capable of coordination with the candidates' campaigns. The most important component of this second campaign was a product of a major loophole inserted by Congress into FECA in 1979. 16 The 1979 Amendments to FECA exempt from the Act's contribution and expenditure restrictions money, raised by state and local party committees, that is spent on volunteer activity or on voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. 17 The purpose of the 1979 Amendments was in part to remedy the perceived lack of storefront offices, bumper stickers, leaflets, and other traditional "grass-roots" campaign activity during the 1976 election. The decline in volunteer electioneering at the local level in 1976 was attributed to FECA's tight expenditure ceilings and to the decisions of the candidates to focus their resources on capital intensive broadcast advertising. 18 The 1979 Amendments were intended to encourage greater individual involvement in politics by exempting labor intensive activities from the financial restrictions of the Act.'9 The 1979 Amendments permitted private contributions without limit so long as the funds were used to support campaign activities at the grass-roots, and exempted such grass-roots spending from the Act's expenditure limitations.20
In 1980 the Republicans adroitly manipulated the grass-roots exemption to fund the Reagan-Bush field operation almost entirely from private contributions.2' The Republicans coordinated their grass-roots spending and fund-raising at the national level. Notwithstanding the 1979 Amendments' grass-roots focus, nothing in the law requires that the funds be spent where raised or even that the funds be solicited by the state or local party committee that is the nominal beneficiary of the contribution. The national Republican Party, acting as the agent of the state or local party and 20. Although the 1979 Amendments exempt grass-roots activities only when conducted by volunteers, "volunteer" is clearly a term of art since the Federal Election Commision permits parties to give their volunteers "travel and subsistence or customary token payments." 11 C.F.R. ? 100.7(b)(15)(iv) (1984); 11 C.F.R. ? 100.8(b)(16)(iv) (1984) . Such "token payments" could amount to as much as $30 per day. E. Drew, Politics and Money 106 (1983).
21. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 311-12.
using the presidential candidate as fund raiser, solicited and received funds throughout the country and channelled the money raised in states where the party was strong to marginal districts where additional funds were crucial.22
The Republican National Committee (RNC) channelled about $9 million in privately raised money to various states to pay for state and local party activities on behalf of the presidential ticket. When added to the funds that state and local parties raised from their own sources and spent on such activities, total state and local Republican committee spending on be- 44. In subsequent cases, the Court continued to adhere to the Buckley approach that campaign finance regulation is to be analyzed primarily in first amendment terms, that the sole justification for restrictions on campaign financing is the anticorruption rationale, and that the contribution/expenditure distinction may be helpful in determining the intensity of the first amendment interest and the strength of the anticorruption justification.
The Court's strong protection for independent expenditures intended to influence the voters directly without passing through a candidate's hands was underscored in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978) , in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute restricting corporate spending to influence voters in a referendum election. The corporate spending in Be/lotti was in a sense doubly protected. As an expenditure aimed at reaching the voters directly it was the kind of speech given the most protection in Buckley.
Moreover, as the referendum campaign did not involve the election of candidates, there was no danger that public officials would be corrupted and therefore no justification for the limitation on expenditures. The Court rejected the argument that the expenditure restriction was designed to prevent corporations from using their wealth to exert "an undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote" on grounds that there was no showing on the record that corporate advocacy "threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes," and that absent such a showing, expenditure restrictions tend to denigrate, not serve, the first amendment. Id. at 786-89; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (invalidating a city ordinance establishing a limit of $250 on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures). In Ctttziens Agaztnst Rent Control, the Cour found that "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributions to a candidate." Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
Since contributions in connection with ballot measure campaigns raise no danger of exaction of political quid pro quos from officeholders, the Court held that they may not, consistent with the first amendment, be restricted; see also California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding against first amendment attack 2 U.S.C. ? 441a(a)(1)(C), which establishes a $5000 limit on the amount an unincorporated association may contribute to its political action committee, on grounds that contribu-tem was limited in 1976. Although Buckley invalidated the Act's across-theboard ceiling on candidate expenditures-a limit that would have applied to all presidential candidates whether or not they accepted public fundsthe Court in a footnote apparently affirmed a provision that made a presidential candidate's eligibility for public funding contingent on his volun- 55. Alexander reports that independent expenditures were of critical value to Reagan during the New Hampshire primary. Reagan was approaching that state's spending limit, and the Fund for a Conservative Majority spent $60,000 on radio and newspaper advertising, mailings and busing pro-Reagan volunteers to campaign stops. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 142. FCM expenditures were also of value in the Texas primary, when the Reagan campaign was approaching the overall spending limit for the prenomination campaign. Id. Thus, as Drew and Alexander have documented, the easing of restrictions on party grass-roots fund-raising and spending and the lack of an effective independent expenditure limitation permitted a substantial role for private donors and special interest spending and introduced significant inequalities in spending on behalf of the major party candidates in the 1980 election. As politicians, wealthy contributors, fund-raisers, and special interest groups become more familiar with the campaign finance laws it is likely that the publicly funded share of campaign spending will decline further and private money will once again become the engine that drives presidential campaigns.
II.
The financing of congressional elections was never as fully reformed, 
III.
The re-emergence of private wealth and special interest influence at the heart of campaign finance, notwithstanding a decade of reform legislation, need not necessarily be a source of wonder or despair. A cynic could easily conclude that reformers here as elsewhere were hopelessly naive. It was inevitable, the argument goes, that politicians and organizations seeking to influence politics would resist restrictions on their ability to obtain or contribute money. They would circumvent limitations, exploit loopholes, and manipulate regulations with an acumen born of their need for funds and influence. In this view, campaign finance reform, like other measures intended to legislate virtue, was doomed to fail.
The short answer to this analysis is that reform did not fail because it was never fully tried. With respect to congressional elections, the Act was crucially defective in its failure to provide for public funding. Effective elimination of the influence of private wealth, the avowed goal of campaign reformers, requires a comprehensive approach consisting of contribution limitations, expenditure limitations, and public funding. A campaign finance law consisting solely of contribution limitations without concomitant expenditure restrictions and public funding can hardly be said to be reformed unless a structural bias towards well-organized interest groups proficient at soliciting and aggregating small donations constitutes a reform.
Presidential campaign finance reform was similarly incomplete. The relaxation of the restraints on political party spending and the lack of an effective control on independent committee activities permitted the large-scale intrusion of private money into an ostensibly public process. It is difficult to describe this as a truly reformed system. A less cynical, but perhaps more telling critique of reform efforts contends not simply that reform was doomed to fail but that efforts to curtail the role of private wealth in financing election campaigns are misguided and ought to fail. Political freedom, so the argument goes, requires that each citizen have the right to seek and wield influence in the electoral process. Obtaining and exerting political influence requires communication. 87. A central theme of both the Drew and Alexander studies is how the PACs operate at a national level, organizing contributions from outside a state or district. Thus, the officeholder's financial constituency need not have any overlap or community of interest with the electoral one. National groups of realtors, auto dealers, insurance underwriters, milk producers, seafarers, and right-to-lifers can determine whether a Representative or Senator will have the money to mount an effective campaign or will see those resources thrown against multiplicity of requests for action, the key to political influence is the ability to obtain a politician's attention, to gain access. Access is "the required entry ticket for getting something done,"88 and money provides access.
With a host of supplicants banging at his door, the politician is most likely to admit "the ones who gave the money. "89
Of course, big givers and moneyed interests are not the only successful lobbyists on Capitol Hill and money is not the only route to political power. Fleishman ed. 1982) ("Despite the fact that the average direct mail contribution is quite small, research on contribution patterns reveals that income is directly and strongly related to political giving."); H. Alexander, supra note 22, at 75.
Representatives
The low level of political giving need not be seen as a reflection of a lack of concern for politics since in the same year nearly 29% of taxpayers utilized the federal income tax checkoff to earmark a small portion of their tax liabilities to the federal fund used to provide public subsidies to the Presidential candidates. Id. at 423. Most likely, the low level of giving reflects a realistic assessment by most Americans that they are financially unable to give enough to have influence. Thus, while the critique of FECA as inconsistent with the free speech/free market analysis of the electoral process may be well-taken, it is itself subject to criticism as an insufficient description of our politics. The concern for democratic equality has long played a significant part in structuring federal campaign finance regulation. So long as our politics is committed to political equality, unlimited private spending that empowers the rich undermines that commitment and invites efforts to curb the role of private money.
IV.
Our campaign finance laws map the borderland between the values of the marketplace and the norm of political equality.98 They constitute an attempt to reconcile the political ideology which would confer on all citizens equal rights to influence public decisionmaking with the reality of a society in which the principal means of participation and influencemoney-is distributed in a radically unequal way. Our regulatory scheme, an uneasy hybrid of equalizing and free market elements, embodies this tension. Presidential public funding and contribution limits reflect the view of elections as a public function in which private wealth has little place.
Privately funded congressional elections and the Supreme Court's invalida- Yet these reforms would do nothing to further the realization of the goal of political equality in the campaign finance system. The electoral process might be opened to more wealthy challengers (or challengers with wealthy backers), and the proliferation of special interest groups might be curbed, but the political process, and consequently politics itself, would remain in the grip of a minority composed of the wealthy and the well-organized. That is inevitable in any private financing system. As the financial history of the 1980 election indicates, the provision of public funds to candidates is not an effective means of advancing political equality unless the role of private money is sharply curtailed. In 1980, unlimited privately funded party and independent committee spending undid the equalizing effects of public funding. In order to work, then, public funding requires substantial restriction of party and independent committee spending.
Such restrictions are consistent with, if not mandated by, the premises underlying a public funding system. To provide for public funding is to decide that the financing of political campaigns must cease to be an extension of the marketplace and must instead become a public function responsive to the interests of all citizens equally and not according to wealth. Under public funding, the financing of electoral campaigns should be assimilated to the financing of the casting and counting of ballots, on the operatives of a board of elections. The public funding of electoral campaigns, by transforming that process into a public function, requires that campaign finance be insulated from the reach of private wealth.
As Congress was the cause of the loophole created by the 1979 Amendments, Congress could provide a solution by repealing the grass-roots spending exemption. If there is a perception that campaigns require more funds for grass-roots activity,108 that need could be met by increasing the size of the public grant and directing that a portion of it go to state or local committees for traditional grass-roots activities. Such a measure might better serve the purposes of the 1979 Amendments since, as Drew and Alexander have shown, in 1980 the primary beneficiaries of the 1979 grass-roots provision were the Republican National Committee and the Republican Presidential ticket, not the state and local parties.109
The imposition of effective controls on independent spending raises a more difficult constitutional question. While independent spending may provide an important positive role in the private system by making the system open to persons and groups not attached to the candidates or the major parties, unlimited independent spending in a public system ultimately subverts that system by reintroducing the private inequalities the public system is intended to negate.?10
In Buckley, the Court invalidated independent expenditure restrictions imposed in a private system context. Could such restrictions be sustained in the context of a public funding system? The outlines of an affirmative argument may be seen in the Court's campaign finance decisions. Although the dominant theme in Buckley was the protection of unlimited private spending as a necessary adjunct to political freedom, a secondary strand in Buckley reflects concern for the impact of unrestricted, unequalized spending on political equality. The Court's contribution/expenditure line and its validation of FECA's contribution restrictions demonstrate a willingness to accept a brake on the role of private wealth in politics in order to provide for political equality, even at the cost of limiting spending and speech."'
The contribution/expenditure distinction is questionable when presented purely in free speech terms.112 Contribution limits do restrict campaign speech. If no person can give a candidate more than $1000, then none of the donors will be heard much more loudly than anybody else. That, of course, is the purpose of contribution limits, but it restricts the full political participation of the putative $50,000 donor. Moreover, contribution limitations may inhibit a candidate's ability to raise and spend campaign money.
A candidate dependent on a small number of large donors will be unable to raise money to fund the expenditures necessary for communication with the electorate. On the other side of the line, large, widely noted independent expenditures can make a candidate as beholden to the independent spender as to a contributor. The contribution/expenditure line does not map the contours of the first amendment so much as it attempts to impose some restriction on unlimited spending for the sake of egalitarian political values.
Indeed, the Court recently emphasized the applicability of the model of democratic equality to the analysis of campaign finance by reaffirming the constitutionality of the long-standing congressional restriction on corporate political spending.
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee ("NRWC"),113 the Court unanimously upheld a provision of FECA restricting the ability of a certain type of corporation to solicit funds for its PAC by analogizing the solicitation restriction to the related ban on corporations spending money in support of candidates. The "first purpose" of that ban, which the Court deemed sufficient to justify the regulation at issue, "is to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political 'warchests.' "114 That such a restriction would limit both the total volume of political speech and the speech of particular corporations was of little moment.
The NRWC decision is especially noteworthy in that the National Right to Work Committee, although a corporation in form, is a nonprofit, largely voluntary organization which far more resembles the model of a group of citizens banding together to amplify their individual views-like an independent committee-than of a business corporation committing its strictions on spending, incompatible with a private finance system, become essential to preclude the reintroduction of spending inequalities which are inherently destructive of the public funding system. The Supreme Court's disposition of the case currently before it, presenting the constitutionality of section 9012(f),122 could prove critical for setting the future course of campaign finance regulation. The Court has an opportunity to indicate the extent to which a public funding system signals a change in the basic postulates of campaign finance regulation and permits the restriction of private political spending. If the Court were to uphold section 9012(f), that would indicate that a viable public funding system could serve as a constitutional alternative to the historic private funding system and the current mixed private and public system. On the other hand, an invalidation of section 9012(f) would likely lead to a further erosion of the public funding system and accelerate the return to a system financed, in large part, by private money.
V.
The Alexander and Drew reports on the financing of the 1980 elections indicate that FECA's particular weaving of public and private financing is coming unravelled. New attention to the rules and assumptions of our campaign finance system is in order. Alexander's analysis assumes that our system will be-and must be-largely privately funded, and seeks to deal with the consequent special interest influence by expanding the financing roles of parties and individual contributors to counterbalance the PACs and the independent committees. The thrust of this approach is to make the laws of the private funding system more consistent with its basic premises by deregulating the campaign finance market. Drew's solution would be to move toward still greater public funding of federal elections. To be successful this would necessitate sharply curtailing the ability of private individuals and groups to engage in political expenditures in connection with federal elections. This approach would be more consistent with our norm of political equality and would contribute to its fuller realization. To do nothing is essentially to opt for the private system, with special preferences for wellorganized economic or ideological interest groups. This tendency was pursued in 1980, and campaign finance reform does not currently appear to have a high place on the national political agenda. It remains to be seen whether these studies, or perhaps the financial history of the 1984 election, can change that. 
